UPSC Prelims 2020 Q55: Science & Technology – Energy & Environment
- (a) Some use uranium and others use thorium
- (b) Some use imported uranium and others use domestic supplies
- (c) Some are operated by foreign enterprises and others are operated by domestic enterprises
- (d) Some are State - owned and others are privately - owned
Answer: (b) Some use imported uranium and others use domestic supplies
Explanation
IAEA Safeguards on Indian Nuclear Reactors: Reason for Selective Oversight
| Reason | Explains safeguards difference? |
|---|---|
| Some use uranium, others thorium | YES - partially |
| Some import uranium, others domestic | YES - PRIMARY |
| Some foreign-operated, others domestic | No - all Indian government |
| Some state-owned, others private | No - all state-owned in India |
IAEA Safeguards on India's reactors:
- Safeguarded reactors: Use imported uranium
- Non-safeguarded reactors: Use domestic uranium + thorium
Reason: India's 1974 nuclear test led to supplier countries (US, Russia) imposing safeguards on imported fuel. India's Pokharan tests (1998) were on non-safeguarded reactors. India negotiates with international suppliers on safeguard terms.
Answer: (b) Some use imported uranium and others use domestic supplies.
Why each option is right or wrong
- (a) Incorrect. Partial - uranium vs thorium is secondary factor.
- (b) CORRECT. Safeguards tied to imported uranium; domestic uranium escapes international oversight.
- (c) Incorrect. All Indian reactors are government-operated.
- (d) Incorrect. All Indian reactors are state-owned.
Key point
IAEA Safeguards logic: International oversight applies to imports (supplier requirement). Domestic fuel = domestic jurisdiction. India's deal with US (2005) brought more reactors under safeguards voluntarily.
Remember
IAEA Safeguards on Indian nuclear reactors apply selectively because some reactors use IMPORTED URANIUM (subject to supplier safeguard requirements) while others use DOMESTIC URANIUM/THORIUM SUPPLIES (outside international oversight). The source of fuel, not the type, determines safeguard status.
Common mistakes
- Assuming IAEA safeguards based on fuel type (U vs Th). Actually based on fuel SOURCE (imported vs domestic).
- Missing India's nuclear policy complexity - partial safeguards, civilian/military reactor separation.
- Confusing safeguards (IAEA monitoring) with sanctions (no different rules).
Exam tip
India's nuclear program structure: Safeguarded reactors (IAEA oversight, imported fuel) vs non-safeguarded (domestic fuel, no international oversight). This separation allowed India to develop nuclear deterrent.
Sources
- IAEA - India Safeguards Agreement
- Ministry of External Affairs - India-US Nuclear Deal (2005)