Defence

Defence Atmanirbharta: Why Self-Reliance Needs Realism

India made a record ₹1.78 lakh crore of defence equipment in 2025-26 yet remains the world's second-largest arms importer. Why the gap persists, where self-reliance worked and stalled, and what a smarter atmanirbharta looks like.

Jasvin Thinks2026-10-0311 mins

India produced defence equipment worth a record ₹1.78 lakh crore in 2025-26, about four times the 2013-14 level, yet it remains the world's second-largest arms importer. In September 2026, three leading defence commentators, T.N. Ninan, Ajai Shukla and Harsh V. Pant, examined why. Their views converge: self-reliance (atmanirbharta) is the right goal, but over-reach, thin budgets and weak project management slow it down. The way forward is to choose what India must make itself, and to buy the rest smartly.

From chips to ships, from screws to complete weapon systems, this will take India to strategic autonomy.

Rajnath Singh, Defence Minister, NDTV Defence Summit (27 September 2026)

What Actually Happened?

On 17 June 2026, the Ministry of Defence reported that annual defence production rose 15.6% to a record ₹1.78 lakh crore in 2025-26, up from ₹43,746 crore in 2013-14. Public sector units made about 76% of it. Private firms made a record 24%, worth about ₹42,000 crore. Defence exports reached ₹38,424 crore in the same year.

In September 2026, three columnists asked how deep this progress really runs. T.N. Ninan, former editor of Business Standard, argued on 9 September that over-reach has caused failures and costly delays. Harsh V. Pant of the Observer Research Foundation welcomed, in the Hindustan Times on 8 September, the decision to transfer DRDO conventional-missile technologies to eligible public and private companies. Ajai Shukla warned on 29 September that full indigenisation is the most expensive way to acquire weapons.

On 27 September, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh told the NDTV Defence Summit that India's approach is to produce domestically whatever can be made in India, instead of relying on imports. He linked this to strategic autonomy and to new fields such as artificial intelligence, quantum technology and autonomous systems.

Why the Paradox Exists

India received 8.2% of all major arms imports worldwide in 2021-25, second only to Ukraine, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). The big-ticket items are still foreign. Ninan lists 114 Rafale multi-role jets from Dassault Aviation for about $28 billion, six ThyssenKrupp submarines for about $8 billion, and 31 MQ-9B drones from General Atomics for $3.5 billion.

Ninan's explanation is structural. Most countries that built strong defence industries did so on a broad industrial base. India's manufacturing share of GDP has barely moved in three or four decades, and private-sector research and development is thin. Building sophisticated weapons on that base means long lead times. Mazagon Dock, for example, had to wait until the Steel Authority of India could make the high-strength steel needed for submarine hulls.

Shukla adds a second layer. Even platforms marketed as Indian, such as the Tejas fighter, naval warships and many army missiles, source up to 40% of their cost from abroad as materials, components and subsystems. That is not necessarily a failure. Even the world's top arms makers buy proven subsystems: British firm Martin-Baker supplies ejection seats for 50-55% of the world's combat aircraft.

The Cost Ladder: Four Ways to Get a Weapon

Shukla describes a well-known cost hierarchy in defence buying. The cheapest and quickest option is to lease a platform for as long as it is needed. Buying it off the shelf costs more. Buying the manufacturing technology and building it in a local factory costs more again. Designing, developing, testing and making it entirely at home is the most expensive route of all, though it gives the most control.

How Did We Get Here?

1. 1999 The Kargil war exposes the need for a regional satellite navigation system. More than a quarter-century later, NavIC is still not fully functional (Ninan).
2. 2013-14 India's annual defence production stands at ₹43,746 crore (Ministry of Defence).
3. 2014 Make in India is launched; defence manufacturing becomes a flagship goal.
4. 2018 iDEX (Innovations for Defence Excellence) is launched to fund defence start-ups.
5. 2020 Atmanirbhar Bharat is announced; the foreign investment cap in defence is raised to 74% under the automatic route.
6. 2020-21 Defence production reaches ₹84,643 crore.
7. 2025-26 Record production of ₹1.78 lakh crore and record exports of ₹38,424 crore.
8. 2026 DRDO conventional-missile technologies are opened to eligible public and private firms for production (Pant).

Where Self-Reliance Has Worked

• Air defence: India's layered air defence system proved itself during Operation Sindoor (Ninan).
• Missiles: a multi-pronged missile programme, now being opened to private production (Ninan, Pant).
• Artillery: mobile howitzers developed by DRDO's Armaments Research and Development Establishment with Kalyani and Tata (Ninan).
• Flight control: the Tejas digital fly-by-wire software, now being developed further for the Tejas Mk2 and the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (Shukla).
• Submarines: nuclear-powered submarines built at home, though Russian help was critical (Ninan).

Where It Has Stalled

• Engines: the Kaveri engine fell short, so the Tejas relies on General Electric engines. GE's delays, partly because a South Korean component supplier failed, hold up the 180 Tejas jets the Air Force needs (Ninan).
• Navigation: NavIC is not fully functional because of a shortage of working satellites and the failure of an atomic clock (Ninan).
• Rifles: over-demanding specifications, such as interchangeable barrels for different bullet sizes, led to large-scale imports instead (Ninan).
• Naval gaps: destroyers commissioned without towed-array sonar and submarines patrolling without heavy-duty torpedoes (Ninan).
• Fighters: HAL has assembled hundreds of Sukhoi jets but cannot build one on its own, and was left out of the shortlist for the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (Ninan).

The Budget Squeeze

India spends about 2.1% of GDP on defence, against a global average of 2.5%; security experts have suggested 3%, Ninan notes. Defence already takes about a fifth of the Union government's non-interest spending. With limited budgets, projects take longer, and a product can be obsolete by the time it is ready.

Both Ninan and Shukla reach the same conclusion: the skill India most lacks is project management. That means deciding what is doable at home, what must be bought, and when to shut down a project that is not working, so that more money is not wasted on it.

Missiles: From State Monopoly to Competition

Defence Minister Rajnath Singh approved the transfer of DRDO-developed conventional missile technologies to eligible Indian companies, public and private, for domestic production. Until now, missiles were largely designed by DRDO and made by Bharat Dynamics Limited (BDL), a public sector firm.

Pant argues this moves India from a model where the state was developer, customer and manufacturer to one where the state is technology provider, regulator and customer. More production lines mean redundancy and faster output in a long war, where precision weapons are used up quickly. The hurdles are real: integrating a full missile is far harder than making parts, and firms will invest only if orders are predictable. Nuclear-related missiles stay under a stricter framework.

Drones Change the Arithmetic

Ninan points out that the United States lost 45 MQ-9B Reaper drones, costing about ₹1,000 crore each, in its war with Iran. India, which has ordered the same drone, has also ordered 840 kamikaze drones from Tata and Pune-based Nibe.

The wars in Ukraine and West Asia suggest that cheap drones and missiles, fired in large numbers, can neutralise costly platforms. That raises a hard budget question for India: spend less on expensive platforms and more on mass-produced drones and missiles? Ninan cautions that India still faces Chinese armour along the Line of Actual Control, new Chinese stealth fighters and a stronger Pakistan navy, so conventional strength cannot be abandoned.

Connect the Dots

1. India sets a goal of defence self-reliance to protect strategic autonomy from embargoes and supply shocks
2. Production rises fourfold since 2013-14, but complex platforms, engines and sensors still depend on imports
3. A narrow manufacturing base, thin private R&D and tight budgets create long delays and cost overruns
4. Delays force emergency imports, which keep India among the world's largest arms buyers
5. A selective strategy follows: master critical technologies, open production to private firms, buy proven subsystems
6. Cheap drones and missiles in volume become a new measure of wartime staying power

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The Debate

What Could Happen Next?

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Why Does It Matter for India?

What Should We Watch?

• 1. Tejas deliveries: whether GE engine supplies speed up and HAL meets its delivery schedule.
• 2. Fighter engine: progress on an indigenous engine for the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft.
• 3. Submarines: the six-submarine contract and how much design capability India gains from it.
• 4. Private missile production: the first orders placed with private firms after the DRDO technology transfer.
• 5. Exports: progress towards the government's ₹50,000 crore defence export target.

Bottom Line

India has made genuine progress: production has roughly quadrupled since 2013-14 and private firms now make a quarter of it. But the country still imports its most complex weapons, and several flagship programmes have stalled. The lesson from Ninan, Shukla and Pant is the same: self-reliance works best when it is selective, competitive and well managed, not when it tries to make everything at once.

Key Terms

Practice Question (Mains-Style)

• Q. Defence self-reliance is necessary for strategic autonomy, but complete indigenisation is neither possible nor desirable. Critically examine with reference to India's recent defence production record. (250 words, GS Paper III)

Sources & Further Reading

• Business Standard: The search for defence atmanirbharta, T.N. Ninan (9 September 2026)
• Broadsword: Atmarnirbharta in defence: It's not as simple as it seems, Ajai Shukla (29 September 2026)
• Hindustan Times: Privatising missile sector to preserve autonomy, Harsh V. Pant (8 September 2026)
• PIB, Ministry of Defence: Defence production soars to a record Rs 1.78 lakh crore in Financial Year 2025-26 (17 June 2026)
• IANS: 'From chips to ships': Rajnath Singh bats for self-reliant defence ecosystem (27 September 2026)
• SIPRI: Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2025 (March 2026)